AE position paper: IRAQ

Since there is the greatest amount of focus on this particular challenge we will begin our series of foreign policy papers with Iraq.

It is a fundamental flaw of the current policy to set a political objective - ergo a stable democratic Iraq as a model for regional change – and then work backwards attempting to force events to that conclusion. It is particularly dangerous to attempt such a backward driven model with the use of limited military force.

The correct path forward is to access the current climate and realities both in Iraq and the region, and within this framework, our involvement should be in the context of our own strategic, national security interests.

Pursuant to the Authorization for the use of The United States Armed Forces in Iraq, the limited objectives of securing weapons of mass destruction and enforcement of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions have been accomplished. The strategic threat from the nation of Iraq has been eliminated, the regime of Saddam Hussein dismantled, the opportunity for elections and a new constitutional Iraq fulfilled.

The current climate that has evolved from the Sunni insurgency and the subsequent Shiite death squad and militia revenge attacks, while deeply troubling for the people of Iraq and for the region – is not a strategic or direct threat to the United States. While the argument has been forwarded by some that a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq would lead to even more violence and wider escalation of sectarian divides in the region, there is no modern contextual evidence that this will in fact occur. The horrific and bloody civil war in Lebanon during the 1980’s and the Palestinian and Israeli conflict – even the three major Arab Israeli wars – all were contained within very limited scope of specific objectives and did not spill over into a broad, unending regional conflagration. Rapid political accommodations among combatants resolved major combat and created extended periods of relative calm. We do not advocate a complete and hasty withdraw of U.S. Combat forces from Iraq.

Our strategic position both in Iraq and in the region is neither necessitated by nor exclusively limited to, the situation in Iraq. The primary strategic interest of the United States and our allies is a stable supply of oil. Until our economic dependence on this vital resource is reduced or eliminated all together from supply by this region, it is our single most important strategic objective. The necessary force size and posture for this effort is interdependent with realities on the ground and capabilities and intent of potential sources of disruption. The security of the Persian Gulf oil states, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are well within the scope of our own capabilities as we partner with these allies in that cause. At the time of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Saddam boasted the 4th largest military force on earth. The region was awash in terror groups from the birthing of Al Qaeda to established groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and countless others. Lebanon was still embroiled in a civil war and terrorists were striking Israel and Western interests around the globe. Our force size and posture relative to Saddam at the time was miniscule as compared with the capabilities and raw numbers of ground combat forces currently in place within the region. It is therefore logically inconsistent to exaggerate the treats today either in Iraq or in the region as to warrant further deployment or increased military involvement inside the civil war of Iraq.

Within this framework it is fully consistent with long standing United States diplomatic efforts, to engage with our friends and allies, and to court our adversaries either directly or indirectly to champion our greatest weapon – our ideas and values of freedom, self determination, and hope. Throughout the cold war from Churchill to Reagan the greatest efforts set forth were those of communicating to the people of the Soviet Bloc that freedom and hope were alive, that we would not abandon them, and that they had the opportunity to stand up one day, and grasp with their own hands a new way of life and governance. We used Voice of America, endless cultural exchanges, direct diplomacy and summits and covert action to advance freedom from the bottom up. From the labor unions of Poland to the Baltic Sea and beyond, freedom was whispered on the lips of the downtrodden – until those fateful and wonderful days in 1989. So too must be our outreach to the Arab world and to the Persian Empire of Iran. Not shouting across the sea at twisted and diabolical leaders – but in subtle acts of genuine kindness and strength of purpose – communicated directly to the people.

To this end we purpose the following concrete steps that should be undertaken with the full measure of our diplomatic and military efforts, and coordinated with the best minds on both sides of the political isle both at home and abroad.

1. An unyielding pursuit of terrorist organizations world wide - directly linked to September 11, 2001 and subsequent attacks on our friends and allies.

2. Increased emphasis on human intelligence and symmetrical application of force to match the size and scale of operations and operatives on the ground planning to do us harm. We need to have the best possible real-time information about who is planning to harm us, and where they are. We need to ACT without delay or regard to developing further leads. Much of the failure of 9-11 was due to the fact that we had some of the ring leaders in our gun sights at one time – yet failed to pull the trigger. The bigger fish may be calling the game plan, but it is the piranhas that conduct the operations. Kill all the smaller fish immediately.

3. When possible - kill the big fish supporting the operations without regard to collateral damage or political fallout.

4. Scale back and redeploy - within Iraq - our overall force posture with the following specific mission objectives. Let the commanders decide how to get it done.

a. Secure the borders of Iraq and protect the territorial integrity in order to isolate the internal warring factions, while providing strategic balance.

b. Deploy hundreds of armed UAV’s and small special operations units to limit the movement of enemy combatants and target specific terrorist’s cells. This focus will be to control the view of the battle field and provide real-time actual intelligence for specific missions, rather than general patrols that leave our troops vulnerable

c. Begin to secure the oil reserves and capacity of Iraq in order to facilitate eventual return of Iraqi oil to the world market for reconstruction costs.

5. Stand down from the hostile and very public rhetoric with respect to the regional players Iran and Syria. Continue with financial and military pressure quietly and without the incessant drumbeat of escalation and conflict as a backdrop.

6. Open back channel dialog with Iranian and Syrian officials via the good offices of diplomacy of our friends in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We should angle at splitting the divide in public support for Amadinajad and the Ayatollahs. We should for the time being, reassure the Iranians and the Syrians that “regime change” is not on our agenda.

7. Open VOA broadcasts and flood the region with alternative messages. We must also use underground networks of special operations to reach out to local and tribal leaders to forge new relationships at the family level.

8. Mosques and neighborhoods that are sympathetic, quiet, and calming influences will be singled out for support, hostile mosques and madrassas and their radical clerics will be targeted for disruption, and if necessary – targeted assassination.

9. Support efforts by the major regional powers to come together at a multi-national, regional conference to establish a broad understanding of principles that will be the basis for further reconciliation and stabilization.

10. Leave no stone unturned in an effort to stabilize the region, while limiting our direct involvement in hostilities between local factions.

By recommitting our National focus on our larger strategic objectives, we will force the Iraqis to consider for themselves the future which best serves their needs. In the end this may be a limited confederation of separate but equal States. It will require sacrifice and confidence building measures that may best be served by extracting the various sectarian elements from each province and re-structuring the foundation of the constitution to provide separate but equal access to the opportunities of a once unified Iraq. Ultimately the decision must be made and implemented by the Iraqis devoid of outside interference in order for it to take hold and generate a stable future, and bring the return of hope to the cradle of humanity.

In the end, the Middle East may not be a new bastion of democracy and constitutional republics; it may be governed by theocrats and democrats alike. There may be new nations formed or old ones secured. But if we are true to our values, principles and respect for self determination and human life – then we will not have to be afraid of this diversity – rather we will have won the day, by letting the people of that region discover for themselves – a new way forward.